

GAC Meeting with GNSO Council

Session 9

Agenda

- 1. Introductory Remarks (GAC Chair/GNSO Chair) [5 minutes]
- 2. RDRS [15 minutes]
- 3. Urgent Requests / Law Enforcement Authentication [10 minutes]
- 4. Accuracy [10 minutes]
- 5. DNS Abuse [15 minutes]
- 6. AOB [5 minutes]



RDRS

- The GAC appreciated the opportunity to provide comments to the RDRS Standing Committee Council
 report issued in August. To increase its utility, the GAC reiterates its position that the RDRS should
 continue beyond the pilot and become mandatory for all gTLD registrars and optional for ccTLD
 operators. As already discussed during ICANN83, the GAC is concerned by the increasing number of
 registrars withdrawing from the pilot.
- As indicated in its response to the public comment, the GAC further believes that immediate work on the RDRS should include incorporation of the solution for LEAs authentication whenever available and technical enhancements to improve the user friendliness of the tool. The GAC also agrees with the RDRS Standing Committee that work on Privacy/Proxy would be very useful but disagrees on a blanket rejection of all EPDP Phase 2/SSAD Recommendations.
- The GAC would appreciate details on the GNSO's approach towards next steps following the public comment period and particularly on the timeline and options for the future of RDRS, noting that its pilot period is rapidly coming to an end and that the public comment highlighted diverse opinions on what needs to be done within the ICANN community.



Urgent Requests/Law Enforcement Authentication

- The GAC would like to express satisfaction for the good cooperation between all parties in the
 Implementation Review Team (IRT) that is tasked with establishing the timeline for urgent requests for
 registration data. In particular, the GAC is supportive of the current compromise text, pending public
 comment, that foresees a timeline of 24-hours with possible extension to 72-hours in exceptional
 circumstances (force majeure)
- At the same time, the GAC is concerned by the latest insertion in the IRT text, which seems to imply
 that the authentication mechanism for law enforcement would require new policy development in order
 to be enshrined in Consensus Policy. As the GNSO is aware, the work to set up the authentication
 mechanism is already ongoing and progressing well with participation of PSWG, Contracted Parties and
 ICANN org.
- The GAC would appreciate the perspective of the GNSO on this matter, in particular in light of the trilateral agreement between the ICANN Board, the GNSO and the GAC that set up two parallel workstreams (timeline and authentication) as part of the same implementation process of the already established Consensus Policy (EPDP Phase 1).



Accuracy of Registration Data

- The GAC read with interest the conclusions of the GNSO Small Team on Accuracy and understands that the GNSO Council approved all its (four) recommendations during its meeting of August 2025.
- The GAC would appreciate more details on how the GNSO Council plans to implement these recommendations and particularly Recommendation 1 of the Small Team which concerns "examining the existing process for validating and verifying registration data under the 2024 Registrar Accreditation agreement 1 and the potential impact on registrants if this process is modified". The Small Team did not indicate nor support a specific path for implementing this recommendation although listed potential options such as "referral of the issue to the GNSO Council Small Team on DNS Abuse, further policy work via a narrow PDP, etc." as a way forward. The GAC highlights that it is important to reduce the time for the verification of registrant contact details from its current 15-day period as abuse associated with maliciously registered domain names tends to occur very shortly after registration. Ideally, validation and verification should be done before the domain name becomes active.
- Could the GNSO Council elaborate on what options are under discussion for implementing Recommendation 1 (above) as well as concerning the implementation of other recommendations from the Small Team?



DNS Abuse

- The GAC appreciated the work of the GNSO Small Team on DNS abuse (summarized in its final report) and the subsequent preparation from ICANN org of a preliminary issue report on a Policy Development Process on DNS abuse mitigation. The GAC welcomes that the Issue Report takes into account the latest GAC Advice to the Board on the topic of DNS Abuse. The GAC considered both documents thoroughly and submitted a response to the Public Comment proceedings highlighting some elements of importance for governments.
- Following the conclusion of the public comment period, the GAC would welcome any reflection from the GNSO on
 the feedback received from the various communities and any update on the timeline and next steps for launching
 the PDP on unrestricted APIs and associated domains suggested in the Issue Report. The GAC reiterates that the
 organization of the upcoming PDP(s) into narrowly scoped track(s) should be conducive to effective and fast
 delivery of the PDP.
- The GAC [as expressed in its Public Comment to be submitted by 18 October 2025] would also welcome further reflections from the GNSO Council on additional paths for addressing policy gaps of importance to the GAC, which are indicated in the GNSO Small Team final report and the Preliminary Issue Report, but which are not prioritized for the first PDP effort, such as: proactive monitoring/preventative measures, accuracy and transparency of reporting obligations.



Any Other Business

Question from the GNSO Council to the GAC

As human rights are a foundational part of our work, no policy development process is complete without an assessment of its potential human rights implications.

GAC colleagues, could you share how you are operationalizing this commitment in your work (Communiqués and other aspects?)

We would be interested to learn from your approach, as we are implementing Human Rights Impact Assessments in every Policy Development Processes moving forward.

